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BOOK REVIEWS
the mentally ill and the proper relationship between mental disease, the crim-
inal, and the administration of criminal justice. All in all, "Psychiatry and the
Law" is both a useful and practical text for the journeyman trial lawyer, and
an interesting source of ideas on suggested public policy in a difficult and poorly
Lindeistood field.
RExFORD H. CARUTHERSt
JURISPRUDE.NCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW. By Edwin W. Patterson. Brook-
lyn: The Foundation Press, Inc.. 1953. Pp. xiii, 649. $7.50.
This work is described by the author, who is Cardozo Professor of Jurispru-
dence at Columbia University, as an invitation as well as an introduction to
jurisprudence. As indicated in the preface,' the method adopted is to analyze
and appraise the general theories about law that have been most influential on
the law of the United States of America; in many instances, sketches are given
of the personality and the social environment of the men by whom these theories
have been contributed to current legal thought. The book has the merit of ex-
tending jurisprudence much beyond the conventional limits of the English
analytical school; a major part is devoted to legal philosophy, and concise con-
sideration is given to the relations of legal theory to philosophy generally and to
the social sciences. Nevertheless, the scope of the subject matter is ostensibly
foreshortened in time, space, and substance to the general ideas about law which
have been influential in the contemporary American scene.
It is somewhat incongruous thus to project a study of general legal ideas, if
not in local terms, at least in a local perspective. In some measure, this may be
justified as the author's prerogative. But it is also pertinent to note that this
work originated to meet the needs of the required course in jurisprudence in-
troduced at Columbia in 1938, being preceded by four mimeograph editions in
which it had a "thorough tryout." As such, it doubtless also reflects the extent
to which the horizons of legal education in these latter days, in the United
States as elsewhere, have tended to coincide with the national boundaries. It is
a question how far the course in jurisprudence, which provides an opportunity
to enlarge the interests of future members of the legal profession in the more
fundamental aspects of justice, should make concessions of this nature to the
professional interest in positive law. In justice to the author, who recognizes that
the viewpoint adopted approaches that of a cultural anthropology, it should be
added that, despite the professed national bias, a majority of the figures and
ideas treated in the book are-as is inevitable-not native American. This
obviously is desirable on various counts. As the distinguished scholar, Munroe
Smith, who inaugurated the study of jurisprudence at Columbia on the broad
basis of comparative legal history and legal science, once observed, a merely
national science of law is a contradiction in terms. And assuredly, in this
modern era of progressively integrated international relations, it is incumbent on
those who in the name of jurisprudence are elected to lead the legal profession to
envisage their task in correspondingly cosmopolitan terms.
"Jurisprudence," as defined by the author, "consists of the general theories of,
or about, law."- Following a preliminary consideration of the Province of
Jurisprudence in Part I, in which the meanings of the term, the relations be-
tween law and philosophy, and the significance of the several social sciences for
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the jurist are examined, the treatment is directed to three central topics: What
Is Law? (Part II); What Is the Law? (Part III); What Should Be the Law?
(Part IV); to which is appended a chapter on the Judicial Process (Part V).
With respect to the first central topic, What Is Law?, a survey of the "basic"
characterizations in ideal, institutional (historical or sociological), imperative,
and social-control conceptions of law is followed by chapters exploring three
dominant features of law, its generality, its normative character, its authority or
sanction. Within this classification, a variety of subordinate questions are covered,
such as various representative views on the nature of law, the function and
logical implications of the rule of law, the meanings of rules, norms, and operative
facts, the authority and sanction of law, the legal status of international law,
and the like. In general, the position taken by the author in considering these
matters differentiates ethics from law on the ground that law includes a variety
of values without ethical content and defines law by relation to the state (the
definition of which is left to political science) as a body of legal norms prescrib-
ing the official conduct that should follow stated operative facts, which has the
authority and sanction of the state.
Part III deals with the sources, forms, and systemic relations of state law.,
Here, after a brief chapter on the Uses of Law by the profession and the lay-
man, the various sources of law are analyzed: legislation, case law, opinions of
experts, principles of morality, societal facts. Two following chapters deal,
respectively, with legal system and terminology (in which special attention is
given to the hierarchies of legal norms propounded by Kelsen and Pound and
the logical analysis of legal terminology), and with the system of stare decisis,
notably as conceived by Oliphant and Goodhart.
Part IV is concerned with legal philosophies, with the law that should be; it
occupies over one third of the volume and is in certain respects the most v~ilu-
able part. After a brief reference to the uses of legal philosophy, consideration
is given to the contributions of: natural law; Kant and the neo-Kantians; the
historical and evolutionary theories of Savigny, Maine, Ames, Spencer, Hegel
and Marx;,utilitarianism (Bentham and Ihering); pragmatism (Jkmes, Dewey,
and, Holmes); Pound's sociological jurisprudence; Cardozo's conception of the
judicial.process; and American legal realism, with which last the author ex-
hibits judicious sympathy. This survey is followed by the chapter on the .Jidicial
Process, which has already been mentioned, a table of cases, a useful list of
books, and periodicals cited, and an analytical index.
This textbook has signal merits. It is concise, methodical, judiciously critical,
written in a clear and practical style. Among its other virtues is that it candidly
indicates the countervailing considerations on problematical issues, as viewed by
a relatively objective critic. It embraces not only legal analysis and legal philos-
ophy but a variety of other and more mundane matters, more than are typically
found in books on jurisprudence. In particular, mention should be made of the
author's discussions of the philosophical and logical aspects of law as providing
valuable accounts of contemporary developments in these areas. On the other
hand, the basic ideas of law-rights, duties, property, contract, and the like-
are dealt with interstitially, not as such. Like other recent texts on jurisprudence
published in English, it reveals the enormous influence of Roscoe Pound's teclmi-
que and teaching in this field; the author, who describes himself as an "axiological
realist," indicates that, tentatively at least, Pound's doctrine of social interests
seems to him the best constructive legal philosophy. For the purposes of a text-
book that seeks to catalogue and criticize in an orderly manner the great variety
of questions connoted by the broad and ambivalent conception of jurisprudence,
the eclectic approach is excellently designed.
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However, there are questions, which the reading of a book so large in scope,
inevitably evokes. Thus, points of detail might be queried, where the exposition
is too compact to be precise or perhaps has slipped in some venial detail. Only a
few can be noted: e.g., on page 241, it is said that "some states" have compul-
sory automobile liability insurance-it would be helpful to know which states
these are, in addition to the well-known Massachusetts legislation. On page 251,
spatial limitation of the operation of legal norms is said to be more recent than
that by nationality; this is quite misleading without an explanation that "nation-
ality" is meant in the unusual sense of tribal relationship. And the suggestion,
on page 258 that the possibility of employing unique technical symbols in such
branches of law as Real Property and Conflict of Laws permits more effective
control over legal reasoning, may perhaps cause some querulous eyebrows to
quiver. Other questions strike deeper. For example, the critique of Kelsen's "Pure
Theory of Law," inappropriately described as a "power system," seems to the
reviewer (who is no follower of Kelsen) almost entirely misconceived; without
elaborating the details, none of the four stated deficiencies of the system, as set
forth on pages 262-265, appears to be inherent in the scheme. What is more,
the critique misses the main point, viz., that "pure" law is law with the vital
ethical, political, and sociological elements expurgated. But this is a point that
the author, who also accepts the imperative conception of law, is not in position to
make.
This p esents what is perhaps the most critical issue involved in the eclectic
view rf Jurisprudence presupposed. This straddles the chasm in current juristic
thinking between the traditional, speculative, and formal modes of legal analysis
(on the one side, and on the other more pragmatic-or, if you please, realistic-
types that seek to relate legal norms to their ethical and social context. The
eclectic solution, which has been most successfully employed by Roscoe Pound, is
to bridge the chasm by accepting the conceptions of law as both formal, authori-
tative norm, and, at the same time, as means to achieve desired social objectives.
So too the author subscribes both to "axiological realism," envisaged in a scheme
of social interests, and likewise to the imperative or formal conception of law.
The iustification offered, in terms of policy, is that the authoritarian conception
conserves peace and, logically speaking, that ethical and social elements are not
pecuhar to law. But in fact the important condition of legal rules is that they
ate believed to be Just; when they deviate from the basic ideas and needs of the
time, they must wither on the vine. The issue thus is whether it is possible or
propet to exclude from the domain of law the essential elements that give it
sense and life.
A final question concerns the broader objectives of legal education. As the
author intimates, ".jurisprudence" is a category diffuse enough to serve a variety
,,f purposes in the primarily dogmatic scheme of legal training. Should it be
utilized to describe the overall operation of a system of positive law? Or survey
the general legal ideas received in a given legal culture? Or explore the sophis-
tications of legal analysis? Or follow the more celebrated flights of legal phil-
.,sophy? There are no inevitable answers to questions such as these; one can
but suggest preferences. In the reviewer's judgment, a required course in
iurisprudence should be a challenge to the student to consider the more fun-
damental aspects of law that, in the typical scheme of legal education in the
United States today, are likely to be slighted. It is obvious that the intensive
study of the great mass of existing law, principally on the basis of collections
of cases, has involved serious sacrifices in other directions. Legal history has
some time since had to take a back seat; the comparative study of other legal
systems, even of the civil law, is a luxury available only to relatively few ad-
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vanced students; there is much room to develop more logical analyses of basic
legal ideas; still more to explore the factual conditions and motives of the law.
These possibilities should be drawn to the attention of prospective members of
the bar, and, what is even more important, this should be done in a manner in-
spiring them to read the more significant contributions to legal science on their
own, so that, in the busy concerns of later practice, they will still contrive to keep
themselves contemporaneously informed.
With objectives such as these in view, a textbook on jurisprudence might be
more of an exploration than a flat survey of the grander phases of justice, in
which consideration would be given to the basic conceptions of property, con-
tract, crime, and the like, and to the relevant social interests and policies, en-
visaged in terms of their history and comparative development in the different
legal systems, as well as to logical or philosophical discussions of the general
nature of law. It is gratifying that this new textbook has measurably extended
the logical and philosophical horizons of jurisprudence. It is no criticism that
there is still much to add, especially from the realm of comparative legal science.
Indeed, it seems to the reviewer that the study of the more abstract ideas about
law should be systematically integrated with the substantive general concepts to
which they relate.
HEssn E. YNTE MA t
t Research Professor of Comparative Law, University of Michigan School of
Law.
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